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HE major developments in the field of civil procedure during theTSurvey period occurred through judicial decisions.
I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
The supreme court took up taxpayer standing in two significant deci-
sions during the Survey period. In Bland Independent School District v.
Blue,' the court first addressed several procedural questions. Noting that
standing is a prerequisite of subject matter jurisdiction, the court stated
that the question of standing can be raised by a plea to the jurisdiction, as
well as other procedural devices, including a summary judgment motion.2
The court further held that, although the issue of standing should be de-
termined without delving into the merits of the case, the trial court is not
confined to the pleadings, but instead can and should hear such evidence
as is necessary to decide whether it has jurisdiction. 3 "Whether a deter-
mination of subject matter jurisdiction can be made at a preliminary hear-
ing or should await a full development of the merits of the case must be
left largely to the trial court's sound exercise of discretion."'4 In this re-
gard, the court contrasted a jurisdictional challenge based on amount in
controversy, where the trial court should accept the plaintiff's good-faith
allegations as true and not require it to prove its case at a preliminary
hearing, with a challenge to, for example, associational standing, where
an evidentiary inquiry into the nature and purpose of the organization
may be necessary.5
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1. 34 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. 2000).
2. Id. at 553-54.
3. Id. at 554. Accord Wilmer-Hutchins indep. Sch. Dist. v. Sullivan, 51 S.W.3d 293,
294 (Tex. 2001). Although the plaintiff in Sullivan pleaded that she had exhausted her
administrative remedies, the uncontested evidence was to the contrary, and the trial court
therefore lacked jurisdiction. Id. Moreover, the supreme court held that subject matter
jurisdiction could not be conferred by estoppel based on the plaintiffs allegation that the
school district misled her about the availability of an administrative remedy. Id. at 294-
305.




Having addressed the procedural issues, the court turned to the sub-
stantive problem of taxpayer standing. The court recognized the long-
standing general rule that taxpayers do not have the right to contest gov-
ernment decisions without showing some particularized injury,6 as well as
the established exception to this rule allowing a taxpayer to seek an in-
junction against the illegal expenditure of funds.7 In Blue, the taxpayers
sought to enjoin the school district's future payments under a lease fi-
nancing agreement, pursuant to which the district had funded the al-
ready-completed construction of a school building.8 The supreme court
held that the equity exception to the rule precluding taxpayer standing
did not extend to this situation. 9 The court reasoned that "the potential
for disruption of government operation is too great to allow a taxpayer
with no special injury distinct from the general public's to sue to prohibit
the government from paying for goods and services it has already re-
ceived and placed in permanent use." 10
The high court also had to grapple with taxpayer standing before it
could address the constitutionality of the Tarrant County jail's religious
education program in Williams v. Lara.I Specifically, the court held that
one of the plaintiffs could not claim taxpayer status by virtue of her pay-
ment of rent or sales taxes.12 The other plaintiff, however, paid property
taxes in Tarrant County and therefore qualified as a taxpayer.' 3 Moreo-
ver, the court held that, because county employees spent a significant
amount of time on the religious education program, its operation consti-
tuted an expenditure of public funds that the plaintiff-taxpayer had stand-
ing to seek to enjoin. 14
Congressional redistricting took the supreme court to the intersection
of ripeness and dominant jurisdiction in Perry v. Del Rio.' 5 Four redis-
tricting cases were set for trial on the same day, two in Travis County and
two in Harris County, and it was left to the supreme court to decide
which should proceed to trial first. 16 To do so, the court first had to re-
solve whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction over a claim
that is not ripe when the case was filed, but subsequently ripens while it is
still pending.' 7 Relying on federal case law it found was consistent with
6. Id. at 555. See also Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W.3d 297 (Tex. 2001) (holding that neither
citizen nor city council member had standing to challenge mayor's executive order prohib-
iting city employees from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation).
7. Blue, 34 S.W.3d at 556.
8. Id. at 549.
9. Id. at 557-58.
10. Id. at 558.
11. 52 S.W.3d 171 (Tex. 2001).
12. Id. at 179-80.
13. Id. at 180.
14. Id. at 183.
15. 66 S.W.3d 239 (Tex. 2001).
16. Id. at 242.
17. Id. at 252.
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its own ripeness jurisprudence,18 the court held that a "claim's lack of
ripeness when filed is not a jurisdictional infirmity requiring dismissal if
the case has matured." 19 In determining which case should proceed,
however, the court held that a party who files suit first will nevertheless
be estopped from arguing dominant jurisdiction if his claims were not
ripe.20 Instead, the high court concluded that dominant jurisdiction
would be conferred on the first court in which a claim that was ripe was
filed, whether in an original or amended petition.21
In Motor Vehicle Board of Texas v. El Paso Independent Automobile
Dealer Assoc'n,22 the court of appeals reluctantly ordered the dismissal
of the case for lack of jurisdiction because of the failure to join an indis-
pensable party.23 The plaintiff had sued various El Paso city and county
officials, challenging the Texas "blue law" prohibiting the sale of motor
vehicles on consecutive Saturdays and Sundays.24 Although served with
notice of the suit, the Texas Attorney General was not named as a party
and declined to participate, stating that the local officials would ade-
quately represent its interests.25 When the local officials determined that
the law was unconstitutional and entered into an agreed judgment, how-
ever, the Attorney General and the Motor Vehicle Board filed post-judg-
ment motions to intervene and a notice of appeal.26 Although the court
of appeals chastised the Attorney General for delaying his entry into the
case, it nevertheless concluded that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. 27
The court stated the failure to name the party responsible for enforcing a
statute as a party to an action to declare the statute unconstitutional is
one of the "rare cases in which failure to name an indispensable party will
deprive a court of jurisdiction. 28
II. SERVICE OF PROCESS
Most trial practitioners are aware that a non-appearing defendant must
be served with new citation for an amended petition if the plaintiff seeks
a more onerous judgment than that prayed for in the original pleading.29
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals applied this rule in a somewhat
unusual manner in Atwood v. B&R Supply & Equipment Co. 30 The origi-
18. Id. at 250. The court opined that, although federal constitutional claims were as-
serted, the ripeness issued should be determined under state law. Id. at 249.
19. Id. at 252.
20. Perry, 66 S.W.3d at 252-53.
21. Id. at 253.
22. 37 S.W.3d 538 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2001, pet. denied).
23. Id. at 539.
24. TEX. TRANS. CODE ANN. § 728.002 (Vernon 1999); Motor Vehicle Bd., 37 S.W.3d
at 539.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 539-40.
27. Id. at 541-42.
28. Id. at 540 (citation omitted).
29. See, e.g., Weaver v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 570 S.W.2d 367, 370 (Tex.
1978).
30. 52 S.W.3d 265 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.).
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nal petition in that case, which was served on the defendants, was worded
as a suit on a sworn account, but was not verified.31 The second amended
petition, on which the trial court granted default judgment, corrected this
deficiency, but was never served on the defendants.32 The appellate court
reversed the default judgment.33 The court reasoned that the original pe-
tition subjected the defendants only to the risk of a default judgment as to
liability for breach of contract, whereas the amended petition converted
the case to a proper suit on a sworn account and allowed the trial court to
enter judgment not only as to liability, but also for damages.34
A trio of cases during the Survey period addressed whether a plaintiff
exercised reasonable diligence in effecting service of citation so as to
avoid a statute of limitations defense. 35 In Harrell v. Alvarez, 36 the court
held that reasonable diligence was established as a matter of law where
the citations were requested immediately, the clerk issued the citations
within three weeks (which included the Thanksgiving holiday), and ser-
vice was effected within five days of the issuance of the citations. 37 In
Keeton v. Carrasco,38 the court held that a fact question existed as to the
plaintiffs' diligence, and a summary judgment on limitations grounds was
therefore improper.39 The plaintiffs in that case originally attempted ser-
vice on the defendant doctor by certified mail, but the return receipt was
not signed by the defendant, and personal service was not effected until
sometime after the defendant failed to answer. Although the court rec-
ognized that this attempted service by mail was ineffective, it nevertheless
allowed that it would not be uncommon for a member of the doctor's
staff to sign the green card and, therefore, an ordinarily prudent attorney
might not have suspected there was a problem until the defendant did not
answer.40 In Belleza-Gonzalez v. Villa,41 on the other hand, the court
held that an oral agreement between plaintiff's counsel and an insurance
adjustor to withhold service of process while counsel searched for records
was unenforceable under Rule 1142 and, therefore, could not constitute
reasonable diligence as a matter of law. 43
31. Id. at 267.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 268.
34. Id.
35. A plaintiff who files suit within the limitations period, but does not serve citation
until after limitations has run, must have exercised "reasonable diligence" in effecting ser-
vice or his claim will be time-barred. See, e.g., Gant v. DeLeon, 786 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Tex.
1990).
36. 46 S.W.3d 483 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2001, no pet.).
37. Id. at 486.
38. 53 S.W.3d 13 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet.).
39. Id. at 20.
40. Id. at 19-20.
41. 57 S.W.3d 8 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet. h.).
42. TEx. R. Civ. P. 11.




As most practitioners are aware, special appearances are subject to the
due order of pleading requirement. During the Survey period, the case of
Landry v. Daigrepont44 considered whether a defendant waived his spe-
cial appearance by arguing his motion for new trial prior to obtaining a
ruling on his special appearance. 45 After learning that a default judgment
had been taken against him, the out-of-state defendant filed a motion for
new trial, which expressly stated that it was "subject to [his] special ap-
pearance."46 At the hearing before the trial court, defendant's counsel
advised the court that the hearing concerned "a motion for new trial pre-
ceded technically by a special appearance both being heard [at the same
hearing]." '47 Defendant's counsel stated that although the special appear-
ance needed to precede any ruling by the court on the motion for new
trial, he would begin with argument on the motion for new trial because it
would be easier for the court to follow.4 8 The trial court granted the mo-
tion for new trial and special appearance. The appellate court reversed
based on Rule 120a(2),4 9 which provides "any motion to challenge the
jurisdiction provided for herein shall be heard and determined before a
motion to transfer venue or any other pleading may be heard. ' 50 The
court concluded that because the defendant's counsel had argued his mo-
tion for new trial before the special appearance had been determined, he
had waived his special appearance. 5'
In Stauffacher v. Lone Star Mud, Inc.,52 the court considered which
party has the burden of proof when an alter-ego allegation is relied on as
a basis for personal jurisdiction. Lone Star filed suit against Stauffacher
and six other defendants, alleging that they had failed to pay for services
provided in connection with an oil well in Fannin County, Texas. Stauf-
facher alleged that the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over
him because (1) he was not a Texas resident, (2) Lone Star's suit did not
arise out of his personal business in Texas, (3) he did not individually
conduct business in Texas, (4) he did not individually own property in
Texas, (5) he had no personal involvement or individual interest in the
subject matter of the suit, (6) he did not make any representations to
Lone Star, either in an individual or representative capacity, and (7) he
did not take any act constituting minimum contacts with Texas. 53 Lone
Star responded alleging that the other defendants were Stauffacher's al-
ter-egos and presented evidence of a significant connection between the
44. 35 S.W.3d 265 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet. h.).
45. Id. at 267.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 267-68.
48. Id. at 268.
49. TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a(2).
50. Id.; Landry, 35 S.W.3d at 268.
51. Id.
52. 54 S.W.3d 810 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet. h.).
53. Id. at 813.
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other defendants and Stauffacher.54 The trial court overruled the special
appearance, and Stauffacher appealed. 55
On appeal, Stauffacher, relying on 3-D Electric Co. v. Barnett Con-
struction Co.,56 contended that Lone Star had the burden to demonstrate
the existence of an alter-ego relationship and had failed to do So.57 The
court of appeals rejected Stauffacher's argument and held that the non-
resident must negate all bases of personal jurisdiction to prevail in a spe-
cial appearance, including allegations of alter-ego.58 The court distin-
guished Barnett Construction on the basis that the trial court had initially
overruled the special appearance in that case and only reconsidered its
ruling on personal jurisdiction after a full trial on the merits.59
IV. VENUE
The propriety of interlocutory appeals to venue challenges was again
the subject of several opinions during the Survey period. In American
Home Products Corp. v. Clark,60 the supreme court confirmed that sec-
tion 15.003(c) of Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code61 does not
provide a dissatisfied defendant with an interlocutory appeal from a trial
court's venue decision under section 15.002.62 In this Fen-Phen case,
eleven plaintiffs sued ten defendants in Johnson County, Texas, for per-
sonal injuries allegedly arising out of their use of the diet drugs. Nine of
the plaintiffs lived outside of Texas, and only one of the Texas residents
lived in Johnson County. American Home challenged venue as to all
plaintiffs except the Johnson County resident, in response to which the
plaintiffs noted that they had all sued the Johnson County physician who
had treated the Johnson County plaintiff. The trial court denied Ameri-
can Home's motion to transfer without specifying the bases for its deci-
sion. American Home then brought an interlocutory appeal. The
appellate court abated the appeal, however, pending the trial court's is-
suance of a new order specifying the grounds for its decision. The trial
court, relying upon the fact that each of the plaintiffs had sued the John-
son County physician, then concluded that venue was proper under sec-
tion 15.005.63
The court of appeals and supreme court both affirmed, holding that the
defendants did not have the right to take an interlocutory appeal because
54. Id.
55. Id. at 814.
56. 706 S.W.2d 135, 140 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
57. Stauffacher, 54 S.W.3d at 816.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 38 S.W.3d 92 (Tex. 2000).
61. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.003(c) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
62. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.002 (Vernon Supp. 2002); Clark, 38
S.W.3d at 96.




section 15.00364 did not provide such a right where the trial court has
ruled, as this one had, that venue was proper under section 15.002.65 Jus-
tice Enoch authored a concurring opinion that acknowledged the propri-
ety of the majority's technical reading of the venue statute, but noted that
from the face of the petition it seemed clear that the Johnson County
doctor had only treated the Johnson County plaintiff and none of the
other plaintiffs. 66 As a result, the concurrence expressed amazement as to
why the trial court would ever have issued an order concluding that each
plaintiff had independently established venue, and noted that the trial of
the case would be a complete waste, since improper venue is grounds for
mandatory reversal. 67
In In re City of Irving,68 the defendants unsuccessfully sought a writ of
mandamus to challenge the trial court's denial of their motion to transfer
venue. In rejecting the writ, the appellate court held that, while the Texas
Supreme Court acknowledged in In re Masonite Corp.69 that an errone-
ous venue determination may be corrected by mandamus if the waste of
judicial resources is so great as to make the situation a truly exceptional
circumstance, simply the fact that the erroneous venue order will result in
an eventual reversal does not, in and of itself, constitute such an "excep-
tional circumstance. '70
That mandatory venue statutes do not trump the compulsory counter-
claim requirements under Rule 97(a) 71 is the lesson of Compass Explora-
tion, Inc., v. B-E Drilling Co.72 B-E Drilling filed suit in Dallas County
for breach of contract and on a sworn account for failure to pay certain
invoices. Rather than challenging venue or filing a counterclaim, Com-
pass instead filed another suit alleging breach of contract and negligence
in Leon County while the Dallas County suit was still pending. After
obtaining a favorable judgment in Dallas County, B-E Drilling then suc-
cessfully moved for summary judgment in the Leon County suit on the
basis of res judicata. The appellate court affirmed the summary judgment,
rejecting Compass's argument that venue was mandatory in Leon
County, noting that Compass failed to challenge venue in Dallas County,
and holding that Compass's claims in the Leon County action were com-
pulsory counterclaims and should have been brought in the original Dal-
las County suit.73
64. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.003.
65. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.002; Clark, 38 S.W.3d at 96.
66. Id. at 97-98 (Enoch, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 98.
68. 45 S.W.3d 777 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet. h.).
69. 997 S.W.2d 194, 199 (Tex. 1999).
70. City of Irving, 45 S.W.3d at 779; See also In re Colonial Cas. Ins. Co., 33 S.W.3d
399 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet. h.) (declining to extend the line of cases that
allow a mandamus to be granted in the context of mandatory venue challenge beyond suits
affecting the parent-child relationship).
71. TEX. R. Civ. P. 97(a).
72. 60 S.W.3d 273 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, no pet. h.).




Once again, class actions were a hot topic during the Survey period. In
McAllen Medical Center, Inc. v. Cortez,74 the Texas Supreme Court con-
sidered (1) when an order certifying a settlement-only class becomes ripe
for appellate review, and (2) whether a non-settling defendant has the
right to challenge that certification order. Cortez filed a putative class
action against a hospital and a surgeon, based on an alleged misrepresen-
tation to patients that all of the hospital's surgeons were board certified.75
Cortez reached a tentative settlement with the surgeon, and they jointly
moved for certification of a class for purposes of approving the
settlement.76
The trial court entered an order that (1) certified a class action for pur-
poses of settlement with the surgeon only, (2) preliminarily approved the
settlement, (3) scheduled a fairness hearing on the settlement, and (4)
provided for class notice of the class action and the proposed settle-
ment.77 However, the class notice was not directed only to the surgeon's
patients, but to all patients who had cardiac surgery at the hospital. The
notice described class claims against both the cardiac surgeon and the
hospital, but recited that it would not prejudice any other defendant's
right to contest class certification with respect to the claims against it and
that the court would rescind the certification if it did not approve the
settlement after the fairness hearing. 78 The hospital filed an interlocutory
appeal, and the parties agreed to postpone the fairness hearing pending
the appellate rulings. 79
On appeal, the hospital claimed that it was directly affected by, and
therefore had standing to contest, the class certification, class notice, and
settlement. The court of appeals dismissed the hospital's appeal, how-
ever, holding that it did not have jurisdiction because the hospital had not
shown any injury that would give it standing to appeal. 80 The supreme
court disagreed. The court first noted that it had never determined when
an order certifying a settlement-only class becomes ripe for appellate re-
view.8' However, the court had previously held that a trial court must
conduct a complete review of the criteria in Rule 42 before determining
that a case may proceed as a class action and that its focus in this case was
when that inquiry should occur so that it becomes ripe for appellate
review. 82
The surgeon argued that the class action inquiry would occur at the
fairness hearing, and the trial court could review the Rule 42 criteria at
74. 66 S.W.3d 227 (Tex. 2001).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 231.
78. Id.
79. Cortez, 66 S.W.3d at 231.
80. Id. at 232.
81. Id.
82. Id. (citing Southwestern Ref. Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. 2000)).
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that time. The supreme court was not enamored with this argument,
however, claiming that it echoed the "certify now and worry later" ap-
proach that it had previously rejected.83 Because the court had previ-
ously held that a trial court should perform a rigorous analysis before
ruling on whether all prerequisites of certification had been met, it saw no
reason why "settlement-only classes" should merit less rigorous treat-
ment.84 Indeed, the court held that in deciding whether to certify a settle-
ment-only class, the class action criteria designed to protect absent class
members demanded even greater scrutiny.85 Accordingly, the court
found that the trial court's order was ripe for appellate review because it
allowed the plaintiff and the surgeon to proceed without first meeting the
Rule 42 criteria.86
Second, the court addressed whether the hospital had standing to chal-
lenge the trial court's certification order.87 The court of appeals had re-
lied on TransAmerican Refining Corp. v. Dravo Corp.8 8 for the
proposition that non-settling defendants generally have no standing to
complain about a settlement. 89 The hospital argued that Rule 42 does not
allow the trial court to certify a class action against fewer than all defend-
ants and that the certification order injured the hospital in several ways,
giving it standing to pursue its appeal. The supreme court determined
that it did not need to decide whether Rule 42 prohibits piece-meal certi-
fication against individual defendants because it held that a non-settling
defendant has standing to contest a certification of a settlement class if
the non-settling defendant can show that it is adversely affected by the
certification, which would necessarily be a case-specific inquiry. 90
In Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson,91 the supreme court had the
opportunity to further refine its holding in De Los Santos v. Occidental
Chemical Corp.,92 where it had held that an interlocutory order was ap-
pealable when that order altered the fundamental nature of a class by
changing a certified class from opt-out to mandatory and created conflict
between class and its counsel. 93 In Bally, after certifying a class, the trial
court granted a motion for partial summary judgment against the defen-
dant and then overruled two of the defendants' motions to decertify the
class. 94 The defendant filed an appeal and a petition for writ of manda-
mus, which the court of appeals denied based on its conclusion that it did
not have jurisdiction to review these orders.95
83. Id.
84. Cortez, 66 S.W.3d at 232.
85. Id. at 233.
86. Id. at 234.
87. Id.
88. 952 F.2d 898, 899 (5th Cir. 1992).
89. 66 S.W.3d at 233.
90. Id. at 234.
91. 53 S.W.3d 352 (Tex. 2001).
92. 933 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. 1996).
93. Id. at 495.




The supreme court also disagreed with the defendant's arguments that
De Los Santos authorizes appeals whenever interlocutory orders create
incentives for class members to stay in an opt-out class.96 First, the su-
preme court noted that its "narrow ruling" in De Los Santos was based
primarily on its determination that "changing a class from opt-out to
mandatory does not simply enlarge its membership; it alters the funda-
mental nature of the class." 97 In particular, the court stated that De Los
Santos was not about "strategic opting in," which is what the defendant in
the instant case was complaining of; instead, it was about forcing plaintiffs
who had already opted out into a mandatory settlement class.98 The
court found that the trial court's orders in Bally did not change the nature
of the class, nor did they affect the class members' relationships with each
other or with class counsel.99 Because the class members faced no legal
bar to opting out as a result of the pre-notice partial summary judgment
and they were not forced into a class against their will, De Los Santos was
inapplicable. 100
In Northrup v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.,101 the court consid-
ered whether unnamed class members were required to formally inter-
vene in a lawsuit to have standing to appeal the trial court's order
approving its settlement. 10 2 The court held that in class action cases
where the "settlement class" device is used (i.e., where the class is certi-
fied simultaneously with or subsequent to the settlement of the class ac-
tion), pre-settlement intervention is not required for an unnamed class
member to have standing to appeal.103 The court based its conclusion
primarily on two reasons. First, the court held that imposing the inter-
vention requirement on settlement class cases would operate to abrogate
a party's right to interlocutory appeal of a class certification decision. 10 4
Second, the court held that the parties' intervention was not required
under any existing Texas law or the statute authorizing interlocutory
appeals.' 0 5
Two cases during the Survey period addressed the propriety of consid-
ering the merits of a class representative's claims prior to analyzing the
requirements for class certification. In MD Anderson Cancer Center v.
Novak,10 6 the supreme court considered whether a named plaintiff's lack
of individual standing at the time suit is filed precludes the court's exer-
cise of subject matter jurisdiction over the class claims, or whether it is
96. Id. at 355.
97. Id. at 354.
98. Id. at 356.
99. Bally, 53 S.W.3d at 336.
100. Id.
101. No. 13-00-377-CV, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 4031 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi June
14, 2001, no pet. h.).
102. Id. at *24.
103. Id. at *7-8.
104. Id. at *25.
105. Id. at *31 (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(3)).
106. 52 S.W.3d 704 (Tex. 2001).
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simply a factor to consider in deciding whether the named plaintiff would
be a proper class representative. 10 7 Although this issue was a case of first
impression in Texas, the United States Supreme Court had already
adopted the rule that a plaintiff who lacks individual standing when the
suit is filed cannot maintain a class action. 10 8 The Novak court agreed
with this approach and held that when a named plaintiff lacks individual
standing at the time the suit is filed, the court is deprived of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction over both the plaintiff's individual claims and claims on
behalf of the class. 10 9
In Grizzle v. Texas Commerce Bank, N.A., 1" 0 the court addressed
whether the trial court can consider a motion for summary judgment
against the class representative's claims before conducting a class certifi-
cation hearing."' The defendants argued that the trial court could prop-
erly address the merits of the class representative's claim before deciding
whether to certify a class, and, if the class representative had no live indi-
vidual claims, she had no right to bring the suit on behalf of the putative
class. 112 The appellate court agreed and held that until the trial court
duly certifies a class, a suit brought as a class action is treated as if it were
brought by the named plaintiff suing on her own behalf. Thus, the trial
court was not required to conduct a class certification hearing before con-
sidering or ruling upon the defendant's motion for summary judgment." 3
VI. PLEADINGS
In Woodruff v. Wright, 14 the court considered the somewhat unusual
situation of whether a defendant can successfully obtain a summary judg-
ment against plaintiffs whose names and respective claims were inadver-
tently removed from amended pleadings. 115 In Woodruff, several
plaintiffs brought suit against three surgeons, based on their allegations of
medical malpractice. At the request of the defendants, the case was di-
vided for multiple trials on the separate claims of two groups of plaintiffs,
referred to as the "Woodruff" plaintiffs and the "Davis" plaintiffs." 6
Shortly before the trial, involving only the Woodruff plaintiffs, the plain-
tiffs filed their "Twenty-First Amended Original Petition" on behalf of
only the Woodruff plaintiffs and specifically set out only their claims
against certain defendants."17 Significantly, there was no "et al." designa-
tion for the other Davis plaintiffs, and they were not referred to directly
or indirectly in the amended petition. The trial on the claims of the
107. Id. at 708.
108. Id. (citing O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974)).
109. Id. at 711.
110. 38 S.W.3d 265 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, no pet. h.).
111. Id. at 274.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. 51 S.W.3d 727 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. denied).
115. Id. at 730-32.




Woodruff plaintiffs ended in a mistrial, with sanctions assessed against
plaintiffs' counsel. After the mistrial, plaintiffs then filed another
"Twenty-First Amended Original Petition," which named only the Davis
plaintiffs and set forth only their particular claims against the remaining
defendants. 118 Again, there was no "et al." designation or reference, di-
rect or indirect, to any of the Woodruff plaintiffs or their claims. Thereaf-
ter, plaintiffs filed their "Twenty-Second Amended Original Petition,"
which included all of the plaintiffs and their claims.
The defendants filed motions for summary judgment based on the non-
suit of the claims against them by removal of their names and the claims
against them from the two different Twenty-First Amended Original Peti-
tions, arguing that the attempt to revive these causes of action in the
Twenty-Second Amended Original Petition was barred by limitations.119
The trial court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment
and, on appeal, the court analyzed the significance of the omission of the
party plaintiffs and claims in the two amended pleadings.1 20 The court
first noted the well-established rule that an omission of claims against a
party in a petition operates as a voluntary dismissal of that party from the
lawsuit, but conceded that most of these cases referred to defendants
whom the plaintiffs omitted from amended petitions, rather than omitted
plaintiffs.' 21 Indeed, the court found only one published case in which
the court held that when a plaintiff intentionally omits its name from an
amended pleading, that the plaintiff is effectively dismissed from the
lawsuit.122
Plaintiffs argued that the Texas Supreme Court had held in American
Petrofina, Inc. v. Allen123 that the omission and subsequent renaming of a
plaintiff in a later pleading did not prevent that plaintiff's claims from
relating back to the time of the original pleading for purposes of limita-
tions. In American Petrofina, however, there were 985 plaintiffs and only
one was omitted from the petition, but was added later in an amended
petition. 124 Further, all the claims in American Petrofina were identical
and, therefore, the factual claims made in the petition were not impacted
by the failure to name one particular plaintiff. 25
In its decision to apply the reasoning of American Petrofina in Wood-
ruff, the court first noted that the American Petrofina decision repre-
sented a departure from the traditional view regarding party omissions.126
Specifically, in American Petrofina, the supreme court recognized that the
omission of a party generally indicates an intent to non-suit, but because
118. Id.
119. Woodruff, 51 S.W.3d at 730-31.
120. Id. at 731.
121. Id.
122. Woodruff, 51 S.W.3d at 731 (citing Mercure Co. v. Rowland, 715 S.W.2d 677, 679
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
123. 887 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. 1994).
124. Woodruff, 51 S.W.3d at 731.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 733.
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the omission was inadvertent, the plaintiffs' amended pleadings related
back to the original pleading and the claims were, therefore, not time-
barred.127 Although the court conceded that deleting seven of nine plain-
tiffs and then deleting the two remaining plaintiffs is materially different
from omitting one out of a thousand plaintiffs, it recognized that the two
different pleadings each referred solely to the specific plaintiffs who were
preparing for trial.'2 8 The court concluded it was at least understandable
that trial counsel might prepare a petition that focused solely on the up-
coming trial without realizing the ramifications of this act on the other
plaintiffs. 129 Thus, the court reversed the trial court's summary
judgment.1 30
In Buls v. Fuselier,131 the court considered whether the trial court had
committed error when it submitted instructions on the inferential rebuttal
defenses of sole proximate cause and new and independent cause in its
jury charge, and allowed expert testimony on these issues, in the absence
of an affirmative pleading by the defendant. Relying on Charter Oaks
Fire Insurance Co. v. Taylor,132 the plaintiffs contended that a simple,
general denial is not enough to justify an instruction on inferential rebut-
tals and that such issues must be affirmatively raised by the pleadings. 133
The appellate court concluded, however, that Charter Oaks represented a
divergence from a line of cases that held that evidence supporting an in-
ferential rebuttal is admissible under a general denial.' 34 The court fur-
ther found that Charter Oaks had erroneously relied on Evans v. Casualty
Reciprocal Exchange 35 for the proposition that the issue of sole proxi-
mate cause is submitted to the jury only when the pleadings raise the
issue.136 The court believed that Charter Oaks failed to recognize that
Evans was discussing the previous treatment of inferential rebuttals under
Texas's old special issues practice. 137 Similarly, the court found that the
divergence in case law in this area was further exacerbated when another
court of appeals, in Reid v. Best Waste Systems, Inc., 38 incorrectly cited
Lemos v. Montez139 for the proposition that inferential rebuttals must be
raised by the pleadings and the evidence. 140 Rather, the court concluded
that in Lemos, the supreme court never mentioned that inferential rebut-
tals must be pled, and the court had actually analyzed whether evidence
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Woodruff, 51 S.W.3d at 733.
130. Id.
131. 55 S.W.3d 204 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet. h.).
132. 658 S.W.2d 227, 228-29 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ).
133. Buls, 55 S.W.3d at 211.
134. Id.
135. 579 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
136. Buls, 55 S.W.3d at 211-12.
137. Id. at 212.
138. 800 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
139. 680 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1984).
140. Buls, 55 S.W.3d at 212.
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adduced at trial supported their introduction by a jury instruction.141
Based on the foregoing, the court held that a general denial was sufficient
to justify an instruction on inferential rebuttals and that they need not be
raised affirmatively by the pleadings. 142
VII. DISCOVERY
In 1998, the supreme court held, in a mass tort case involving over
3,000 plaintiffs, that the failure to allow defendants to obtain the most
basic discovery from the vast majority of those plaintiffs while the claims
of a few selected plaintiffs were tried was an abuse of discretion. 143 The
court was required to repeat this message during the Survey period in In
re Van Waters & Rogers, Inc.,144 a case it had previously sent back to the
trial court for reconsideration of a similar order abating discovery in light
of its holding in Colonial Pipeline.145 When the trial court denied the
defendant's motion to reconsider, the matter appeared before the su-
preme court again. The court held that a blanket abatement of discovery
directed to over 400 plaintiffs, until a few selected claims were tried, con-
stituted a clear abuse of discretion, especially since no plaintiff had yet
gone to trial in the seven years the case was pending.146 Moreover, the
court warned that the selection of claims to be tried first should be based
on the factors described in its precedent, such as similarity of injuries and
periods of exposure, 147 rather than allowing plaintiff's counsel to unilater-
ally select which claims would be tried first. 148
A municipality sought to withhold a consulting expert's report in re-
sponse to a Texas Public Information Act request in In re City of Ge-
orgetown.149 The city argued that the report was "expressly made
confidential under other law"' 50 and did not, therefore, have to be pro-
duced. A divided supreme court agreed, holding that the rules of evi-
dence and procedure constituted "other law," protecting the report from
disclosure.' 51 The court also held that the city had not waived its objec-
tion by failing to raise this specific statutory exception when it requested
a ruling from the Texas Attorney General. 52
An alleged privilege waiver was also at issue in In re Cooper.153 The
relator in that case, after suffering a judgment in excess of his insurance
141. Id.
142. Id. at 213.
143. In re Colonial Pipeline Co., 968 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. 1998) (discussed in A. Erin
Dwyer, et al. Texas Civil Procedure, 52 SMU L. REV. 1485, 1498 (1999)).
144. 62 S.W.3d 197 (Tex. 2001).
145. In re Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 740, 741 (Tex. 1998) (per curium).
146. Van Waters, 62 S.W.3d at 199.
147. Id. (citing In re Ethyl Corp., 975 S.W.2d 606, 611 (Tex. 1998) and In re Bristol-
Meyers Squibb Co., 975 S.W.2d 601, 603 (Tex. 1998)).
148. Van Waters, 62 S.W.3d at 199.
149. 53 S.W.3d 328 (Tex. 2001).
150. TEX. Gov'T CoDE ANN. § 552.022(b) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
151. City of Georgetown, 53 S.W.3d at 336.
152. Id.
153. 47 S.W.3d 206 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2001, orig. proceeding).
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coverage, assigned his claims against his insurers to the plaintiff in the
underlying personal injury suit.154 The plaintiff-assignee then filed a
"Stowers" case against the insurers and sought discovery of the insured's
attorney's litigation file. 155 The court of appeals held that the mere as-
signment of the Stowers claim did not carry with it a waiver of the in-
sured's attorney-client privilege, although the parties could, and perhaps
should, have included such a waiver.156 In a concurring opinion, Justice
Gaultney expressed his concern that the inevitable request for such waiv-
ers by assignees in future cases would further undermine the already un-
easy relationship between insureds and counsel hired by their insurers. 157
The court allowed a post-judgment deposition of the judgment-debtor's
daughter in In re Amaya.' 58 Although the daughter claimed to have no
knowledge of the location of her father or his records, the court noted
that the judgment creditor had offered some evidence that the father and
daughter had business dealings together, and that the father had con-
veyed to the daughter a house in which, according to his prior testimony,
documents had been located.' 59 The court opined that the ability to de-
pose a close family member in these circumstances was reasonably calcu-
lated to lead to discovery of the father's assets, and that there was no
evidence of harassment or undue burden or cost. 160
Rule 193.6 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure,' 61 adopted as part of
the 1999 revisions to the rules, gives a trial court far more discretion to
allow a late-designated expert to testify than did prior Texas law. Snider
v. Stanley,' 62 however, teaches that a party must continue to exercise dili-
gence in retaining and designating expert witnesses or risk the ability to
use them. The plaintiffs in Snider disclosed their accident reconstruction
experts prior to an October 1999 trial setting. The trial was continued to
allow for mediation, and the plaintiffs' expert was deposed in late Octo-
ber. The case was reset for trial on February 7, 2000, and the defendants
hired their own accident reconstruction expert on December 1, 1999. The
expert's report was provided to defendants' counsel on January 7, 2000,
who mailed it to plaintiffs' counsel the next day.
Under these circumstances, the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision to exclude the testimony of defendants' expert. 163 The
court held that Rule 195.2164 required the defendants to designate their
154. Id. at 207.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 209 & n.2.
157. Id. at 210-11 (Gaultney, J., concurring)
158. 34 S.W.3d 354 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, orig. proceeding).
159. Id. at 358.
160. Id. at 358-59. Importantly, although the court considered the daughter's affidavit,
it stated that it was not proper evidence because it had only been filed with the district
clerk and not offered into evidence, or tendered to the judge, at the hearing on her motion
for protection. Id. at 357 n.1.
161. TEX. R. Civ. P. 193.6.
162. 44 S.W.3d 713 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2001, pet. denied).
163. Id. at 718.
164. TEX. R. Civ. P. 195.2.
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experts at least 60 days, not 30 days, before trial. 165 Moreover, the appel-
late court held that the defendants' designation was not made with rea-
sonable promptness or as soon as practical. 166 The court opined that the
language of new Rule 192.7(c) 167 effectively overrules the supreme
court's decision in Mentis v. Barnard.68 Mentis held that, up until the
thirty-day deadline before trial that applied under prior law, a party was
under no obligation to disclose an expert's identity until she actually de-
cided the expert would testify. 169 In contrast to Mentis, the Snider court
suggested that the defendants should have designated their expert as
soon as he was retained-even before they received his report.170 Fi-
nally, the court rejected the defendants' arguments that the plaintiffs
were not surprised or prejudiced, and held that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a continuance to cure the late
designation. 171
VIII. DISMISSAL
Texas courts continued to wrestle with the sufficiency of notices of in-
tent to dismiss for want of prosecution during the Survey period, even
after the supreme court's pronouncement last year in Villarreal v. San
Antonio Truck & Equipment.172 In Lynda's Boutique v. Alexander,173 the
Austin court of appeals reversed and remanded a dismissal order for want
of prosecution, where the order setting a scheduling conference stated
that the failure to appear for the conference would result in a dismissal of
the case. The appellant did not appear at the conference and the trial
court dismissed the case. The appellate court held that such dismissal was
improper because the plaintiff had not been provided with notice and an
opportunity to be heard, since the order did not state that a dismissal was
certain, but rather only indicated that a dismissal was one of several ad-
verse actions that might occur if a party failed to appear at the confer-
ence.174 The notice, moreover, failed to state the date and location of a
dismissal hearing, and thus failed to comply with Rule 165a.175 Finally,
the dismissal order was also improper because the trial court failed to
165. Snider, 44 S.W.3d at 715.
166. Id. at 716-17.
167. TEx. R. Civ. P. 192.7(c).
168. 870 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. 1994).
169. Id. at 15-16.
170. Snider, 44 S.W.3d at 716-17 & n.5. Although this aspect of the opinion is probably
dicta, given that the defendants designated their expert within 60 days of trial, the court's
suggestion that a potential testifying expert should be designated before his opinions are
known is surely foreign to most trial practitioners.
171. Id. at 717-18.
172. 994 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. 1999) (discussed in Thomas A. Graves et al., Texas Civil
Procedure 54 SMU L. REV. 1629, 1655 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 Annual Survey]).
173. No. 03-00-00498-CV, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 6835 (Tex. App.-Austin Oct. 11,
2001, no pet. h.).
174. Id. at *6-7.
175. TEX. R. Civ. P. 165a; Alexander, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 6835, at *7.
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hold a hearing before dismissing the case.176
The Dallas court of appeals also addressed the issue of proper notice in
two cases during the Survey period. First, in Lopez v. Harding,177 the
appellate court reversed the dismissal of a case pursuant to an order is-
sued only days after the suit had been filed, which provided, in pertinent
part, that if the plaintiff failed to make a written request for a trial setting
by a specified date, the case was subject to dismissal. 178 There, although
the defendants had all answered, the parties had conducted discovery,
and the plaintiff had requested a jury and tendered a jury fee, the plaintiff
failed to request a trial setting by the date specified in the order. Accord-
ingly, the trial court dismissed the case for want of prosecution. The ap-
pellate court reversed, holding that a dismissal would only have been
proper if the plaintiff failed to appear for a hearing or trial of which he
had notice, or if the case had not been disposed of within the time frame
dictated by the supreme court's administrative standards. 179 The court
rejected the appellees' argument that the trial court could dismiss the
case under its own inherent authority, since the dismissal notice specifi-
cally stated that the case was subject to dismissal under Rule 165a,180 and,
therefore, it would be error for the trial court to invoke its inherent au-
thority to dismiss the case. 181
Second, in Franklin v. Sherman Independent School District, 82 a con-
solidated appeal of four cases involving identical facts, the court affirmed
the dismissal of all four cases for want of prosecution. 183 Each case had
been pending for over a year. The clerk in each case issued a notice that
indicated that the case was subject to dismissal under Rule 165a 184 and
set a deadline by which a motion to retain must be filed, or the case
would be dismissed on a specified date. No motion to retain was filed in
any of the cases, but counsel for each of the various plaintiffs wrote the
court before the dismissal deadline and requested a trial setting. The trial
court nevertheless dismissed the cases and subsequently denied verified
motions to reinstate. In affirming the dismissals, the appellate court ac-
knowledged that Brown v. Brookshires Grocery'85 and Villarreal'86 both
held that specific notice of a dismissal hearing and an actual hearing are
required. Nevertheless, the appellate court concluded that, while hear-
ings should have been held prior to the entry of the dismissals, because
the trial court held hearings on the motions to retain, any error commit-
176. Alexandra, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 6835, at *11-12.
177. No. 05-99-02101, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 3527 (Tex. App.-Dallas May 30, 2001, no
pet. h.).
178. Id. at *1-3.
179. Id. at *5-6.
180. TEX. R. Cv. P. 165a.
181. Lopez, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 3527, at *6-7.
182. 53 S.W.3d 398 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, pet. denied).
183. Id. at 400.
184. TEX. R. Civ. P. 165a.
185. 10 S.W.3d 351 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, pet denied).
186. 994 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. 1999).
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ted was harmless. 187
The court in In re Bro Bro Properties, Inc.188 granted a writ of manda-
mus to set aside a default judgment and turnover order entered against
the defendant. In this property dispute case, the plaintiff originally sued
several parties, but eventually filed notices of non-suit against all defend-
ants, except for the appellant. The plaintiff then took a default judgment
against the sole remaining defendant and obtained a turnover order re-
quiring the defendant to tender certain proceeds into the registry of the
court. The appellate court held that, because the trial court had not en-
tered orders of non-suit, and the default judgment did not contain a
"mother hubbard" clause, the judgment was interlocutory, and the trial
court could properly consider the appellant's motion for new trial chal-
lenging the default judgment.189 In reaching this conclusion, the appel-
late court rejected the argument that the notices of nonsuit were effective
when filed, noting that the date of an order dismissing the case is determi-
native of when the trial court's plenary power expires. 190
In Slaughter v. Clement,1 91 the court held that a trial court could not
adjudicate a case on the merits against the plaintiff for failing to appear
for trial, and that the proper procedural mechanism to dismiss the action
in such circumstances was a dismissal for want of prosecution, following
notice and a hearing. 192
Finally, in 3V, Inc. v. JTS Enterprises, Inc.,193 the appellate court, in a
prior proceeding, had ordered that the underlying dispute be sent to arbi-
tration and abated the case pending completion of the arbitration. Three
years later, and without lifting the abatement, the trial court issued a no-
tice of intent to dismiss because its record indicated a "settlement, ver-
dict, or disposition of the case," but that no order had been submitted. In
response, the plaintiff filed a single sentence motion to retain, in response
to which the defendants moved to dismiss the case based on the plaintiff's
failure to diligently pursue the arbitration. Thereafter, the trial court dis-
missed the case. The court of appeals reversed, holding that because the
trial court's notice spoke only to dismissing the case for the failure to
submit a final order, it was precluded from dismissing the case for any
other reason absent a new notice. 194
IX. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Two appellate courts concluded that a party may raise the sufficiency of
a movant's no-evidence summary judgment motion for the first time on
187. Franklin, 53 S.W.3d at 402-04.
188. 50 S.W.3d 528 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, orig. proceeding).
189. Id. at 530-31.
190. Id. at 530.
191. No. 08-00-00174-CV, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 7051 (Tex. App.-El Paso Oct. 18,
2001, no pet. h.).
192. Id. at *4-6.
193. 40 S.W.3d 533 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet. h.).
194. Id. at 543-44.
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appeal. 195 Both courts, while recognizing that other intermediate appel-
late courts had reached a contrary conclusion, 196 reasoned that a movant
should not be able to prevail on a no-evidence summary judgment motion
that violates the express provisions of Rule 166a(i). 197 Rule 166a(i) re-
quires that the motion state the specific elements of the claim or defense
as to which there is no summary judgment evidence. 198 Where the mo-
vant fails to meet these requirements, the nonmovant is not barred from
raising the argument on appeal, even if it was not raised before the trial
court.
In Tempay, Inc. v. TNT Concrete & Construction, Inc. ,199 the court ad-
dressed the question of what is a sufficient amount of time for discovery
before the trial court may properly entertain a no-evidence motion for
summary judgment. The court held that the answer to this question is
case-specific and "is determined by the nature of the cause of action, the
nature of the evidence necessary to controvert the no-evidence motion,
and the length of time the case has been active in the trial court. ''2 0° Fur-
ther, trial courts may consider the length of time the no-evidence motion
has been pending, the amount of discovery that has already occurred, and
whether the movant has abused the discovery process by withholding key
information and then moving for summary judgment on the basis of no
evidence.201 In this case, the appellate court reversed and remanded the
summary judgment, holding that the non-movant had properly preserved
its objection to the motion by filing a verified motion for continuance,
and that the movant had improperly resisted discovery. 20 2
In Aghili v. Banks,20 3 the court reversed a summary judgment that was
based, in large part, upon the affidavit of the attorney who also repre-
sented the movant, holding that the attorney's affidavit was not compe-
tent summary judgment evidence since his testimony did not fall within
one of the five exceptions enumerated in Texas Disciplinary Rule of Pro-
fessional Conduct 3.08,204 and, therefore, the attorney was precluded
from acting as both an advocate and a material fact witness. 205 Absent
the attorney's testimony, the trial court found that a fact question existed
195. Cuyler v. Minns, 60 S.W.3d 209 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet. h.);
Callaghan Ranch, Ltd. v. Killam, 53 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. denied).
196. See Walton v. City of Midland, 24 S.W.3d 853, 857-58 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2000,
no pet.); Williams v. Banc One, Texas, N.A., 15 S.W.3d 110, 117 (Tex. App.-Waco 1999,
no pet.); Roth v. FFP Operating Partners, L.P., 994 S.W.2d 190, 194-95 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1999, pet. denied).
197. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(i).
198. Id.; Cuyler, 60 S.W.3d at 213-14; Killam, 53 S.W.3d at 3.
199. 37 S.W.3d 517 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, pet. denied).
200. Id. at 522.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 523.
203. No. 14-98-01148-CV, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 7839 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] Nov. 21, 2001, no pet. h.).
204. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 3.08 cmt. 4, reprinted in TEX. GOV'T
CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G app. A (Vernon 1998).
205. Banks, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 7839 at *12-15.
2002] 1363
SMU LAW REVIEW
and therefore reversed the summary judgment.20 6
Finally, in Cantu v. Peacher,20 7 the court addressed whether changes in
a witness's testimony from a deposition to a subsequent affidavit are suf-
ficient to create a fact question that warrants the denial of a motion for
summary judgment. In its analysis of this problem, the court concluded
that trial courts must examine the nature and extent of the differences in
the facts asserted in the deposition and the affidavit.208 If the differences
fall into the category of a variation on the theme of the original testimony
given, and the two are otherwise consistent in the major allegations, there
may be grounds for impeachment, but no basis for vitiating the affidavit
entirely. 20 9 If a subsequent affidavit clearly contradicts the witness's own
prior testimony involving the material points of the suit, without explana-
tion, the affidavit must be disregarded and will not create a fact question
sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.210
X. JURY PRACTICE
In In re the Interest of K.R.,211 a case discussed in last year's Survey
article,212 the supreme court held that the trial court did not commit re-
versible error by requiring the defendant, a father convicted of beating a
six-month old to death for soiling his diaper, to appear handcuffed before
the jury throughout his civil trial.2 13 In reaching this conclusion, the court
looked to guidance from the United States Supreme Court, and noted
that while the high court has warned against such actions, it has never
held that shackling a defendant throughout a trial constitutes reversible
error irrespective of its effect on the judgment.2 14 The court concluded
from a review of the evidence that there was no indication that, in this
case, the shackling of the defendant caused the jury to reach a different
verdict.2 15
In Preiss v. Moritz,216 the court held that the unsuccessful plaintiffs in a
medical malpractice case were entitled to a new trial upon discovering
that a juror was not qualified to serve on the panel, especially in light of
the 10-2 verdict.21 7 Although not known at the time of trial, the plaintiffs
subsequently discovered that one of the jurors was under legal accusation
of theft by check. The court noted that it did not believe that the juror
had acted improperly by failing to disclose the accusation, since the juror
assumed that she had cured any legal problem with the check by re-
206. Id. at *16.
207. 53 S.W.3d 5 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. denied).
208. Id. at 10.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 10-11.
211. 63 S.W.3d 796 (Tex. 2001).
212. See 2001 Annual Survey at 1663.
213. 63 S.W.3d 796 (Tex. 2002).
214. Id. at 799.
215. Id. at 800.
216. 60 S.W.3d 285 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, no pet. h.).
217. Id. at 295.
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turning to the store and paying the amount in full and attending a finan-
cial management class required by the court. 218 Nonetheless, because the
juror was statutorily disqualified, and had voted in favor of the 10-2 ver-
dict, the court held that the plaintiffs were materially injured as matter of
law.219
Finally, in Universal Printing Co. v. Premier Victorian Homes, Inc. ,220
the court held that the trial court did not err in refusing the plaintiffs'
request for a jury trial when they failed to timely pay the required jury
fees.22' Although the plaintiffs paid a filing fee when they initiated the
case, the clerk did not credit any of that amount toward the jury fee.
Upon discovering the matter, the plaintiffs immediately tendered an ad-
ditional $30 in jury fees and requested an emergency hearing to place the
case on the jury docket. The trial court denied the motion, but stated that
if the case was not reached within 30 days, it would allow a jury on the
next setting. The trial court, however, was able to reach the case within 15
days, and the case was tried without a jury. In affirming the trial court's
decision, the court of appeals reconciled section 51.604 of the Texas Gov-
ernment Code, 222 which provides that the fee required under that section
must be paid no later than the 10th day before the jury trial is scheduled
to begin, with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 216,223 which requires that a
jury fee be paid 30 days before trial. Specifically, the court held that
these two rules supplement one another and are harmonized by section
51.604(c),224 which states "the fee required by this section includes the
jury fee required by Rule 216, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and any
other jury fee allowed by law or rule. 225 Since the plaintiffs failed to pay
the $10 fee required by Rule 216 more than 30 days before trial, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying them a jury trial, because the
record indicated that granting a jury trial would have interfered with the
administration of the trial court's docket. 226
XI. JURY CHARGE
While broad-form jury submissions have been the norm in Texas prac-
tice for many years,227 they can still create problems for trial practition-
ers. In Torrington Company v. Stutzman,228 the supreme court reversed a
jury verdict on the ground that a broad-form negligence question omitted
218. Id. at 288.
219. Id.
220. No. 01-99-00429-CV 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 1140 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
Feb. 22, 2001, no pet.).
221. Id. at *26.
222. TEX. GOv'T CODE ANN. § 51.604 (Vernon 1998).
223. TEX. R. Civ. P. 216.
224. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 51.604(c) (Vernon 1998).
225. Id.; Universal Printing, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 1140 at *17-18.
226. Id. at *20.
227. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277 ("In all jury cases the court shall, whenever feasible, submit
the cause upon broad-form questions.").
228. 46 S.W.3d 829 (Tex. 2000).
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required elements of the plaintiffs' negligent undertaking claim.22 9 Al-
though the charge included the usual definitions of "negligence," "ordi-
nary care," and "proximate cause," the court gave the jury no instruction
regarding the factual predicate necessary to establish a negligent under-
taking duty.2 30 The supreme court remanded the case in the interest of
justice, rather than rendering judgment based on the defective charge,
because it determined there had been no prior appellate guidance on how
to properly submit a negligent undertaking claim.231
As discussed in last year's Survey article,2 32 the supreme court held in
Crown Life Ins. v. Casteel2 33 that it was reversible error to submit a sin-
gle, broad-form question that includes both valid and invalid theories of
liability.2 34 The two Houston appellate courts have now split on the ques-
tion of whether Casteel's presumed harm rule also applies to the inclusion
in a broad-form question of elements of damages on which no evidence
was presented. In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Redding,2 35 the court held that
Casteel extends to this situation and that "the submission of an element of
damages to the jury for which there is no supporting evidence is harmful
error, where, as here, the charge error has been timely and specifically
preserved. '236 In Harris County v. Smith,2 37 on the other hand, the court
held that the presumed harm standard of Casteel does not apply to the
erroneous submission of an element of damages in a broad-form ques-
tion.2 38 The court reasoned that the policy concerns underlying Casteel,
namely that a judgment not be entered against a defendant without the
assurance that the jury actually found the defendant liable on a proper
legal theory, simply are not compelling enough in the damages context to
justify abandonment of traditional harmful error analysis.2 39
Finally, two appellate courts addressed the propriety of a jury instruc-
tion on spoliation of evidence during the Survey period, with markedly
different results. In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson,2 40 the court of ap-
peals upheld the inclusion of a spoliation instruction where the defendant
229. Id. at 833.
230. Id. at 837.
231. Id. at 841. The dissent objected to this disposition of the case, stating that the
substantive elements of a voluntary undertaking claim, as well as the procedural require-
ment that a plaintiff obtain an appropriate jury finding, were both well established at the
time the case was tried. Id. at 852 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
232. See 2001 Annual Survey at 1664 (2001).
233. 22 S.W.3d 378 (Tex. 2000).
234. Id. at 389.
235. 56 S.W.3d 141 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet. h.).
236. Id. at 153 (emphasis original) (footnote omitted). Accord Iron Mountain Bison
Ranch, Inc. v. Easley Trailer Mfg., Inc., 42 S.W.3d 149 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2000, no
pet.). The dissent in Redding disagreed with the majority on both the substantive issue of
Casteel's scope and whether the defendant properly preserved the error. Redding, 56
S.W.3d at 156-58 (Witting, J., dissenting).
237. No. 01-99-00729-CV, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 2238 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
April 5, 2001, no pet. h.).
238. Id. at *13-14.
239. Id. at *21.
240. 39 S.W.3d 729 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2001, pet. granted).
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store could not produce a reindeer Christmas decoration that had fallen
off a shelf and injured the plaintiff.2 41 The court reached this conclusion
despite testimony from the store's manager about the physical character-
istics of the reindeer,242 as well as what it acknowledged was a reasonable
presumption that the reindeer had been sold as merchandise.2 43 In Lively
v. Blackwell,244 on the other hand, the appellate court upheld the trial
court's refusal to submit a spoliation instruction, or allow evidence, re-
garding the defendant's production of a blank videotape that purportedly
captured the plaintiff's laproscopic surgery.2 45 Although the evidence
showed that the defendant doctor had the tape in his possession until it
was produced in discovery, the court stated that the uncertainty of
whether the surgery had in fact been successfully recorded in the first
place justified the trial court's refusal to allow the "inflammatory" argu-
ment that the doctor had destroyed evidence. 246 If these two cases can be
reconciled, it is on the basis that the trial court has wide discretion in
determining whether to give a spoliation instruction.
XII. JUDGMENTS
The Texas Supreme Court issued several opinions of note regarding the
subject of judgments during the Survey period. In Compania Financiara
Libano, S.A. v. Simmons,247 the court held that a suit to enforce provi-
sions of a prior settlement agreement that were not included as part of an
agreed final judgment did not constitute an impermissible collateral at-
tack on that judgment, since the claims in the second suit did not exist at
the time the original agreed judgment was entered.2 48 In so holding, the
court noted that parties often purposefully exclude settlement terms from
an agreed judgment, and suit for a subsequent breach of the original, con-
current settlement agreement is not barred by the prior agreed
judgment. 249
The supreme court also held in Furr's Supermarkets, Inc. v. Bethune250
that the trial court erred in refusing to tax costs in favor of the prevailing
party under Rule 131251 where the trial court's stated "good cause" for
refusing to tax costs was the losing party's inability to pay costs and her
emotional fragility.2 52 The high court held that a litigant's emotional
241. Id. at 731-32.
242. Although it was apparently undisputed that the falling reindeer cut plaintiff's arm,
the store manager testified that the reindeer were made of papier mache and weighed five
to eight ounces, while the plaintiff testified they were made of wood and weighed about ten
pounds each. Id. at 730.
243. Id. at 731-32.
244. 51 S.W.3d 637 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2001, pet. denied).
245. Id. at 642.
246. Id.
247. 53 S.W.3d 365 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam).
248. Id. at 367.
249. Id. at 368.
250. 53 S.W.3d 375 (Tex. 2001).
251. TEX. R. Civ. P. 131.
252. Bethune, 53 S.W.3d at 377.
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state and financial situation were both insufficient as a matter of law to
constitute "good cause," noting that "[sltress associated with litigation is
an unavoidable consequence of the adversarial process." 253
In a case of first impression, the supreme court analyzed the single ac-
tion rule and statute of limitations as applied to an asbestosis victim in
Pustejovsky v. Rapid-American Corp.254 In this case, the plaintiff had set-
tled an asbestosis suit with one defendant in 1982. Years later, that same
plaintiff developed asbestos-related cancer and brought suit again against
several different defendants, who sought to bar those subsequent claims
based on prior settlement. The court held that applying the single action
rule under these circumstances would constitute an injustice in light of
the medical evidence that showed an asbestos-related cancer might not
manifest itself for many years after the exposure; thus, the application of
the single action rule would be inconsistent with the transactional ap-
proach to res judicata.255 The court, while specifically limiting its holding
to asbestos-related diseases resulting from workplace exposure, rejected
the Fifth Circuit's holdings to the contrary in Gideon v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp.,256 Graffagnino v. Fibreboard Corp.,257 and Dartez v.
Fibreboard Corp.,25 8 and held that the statute of limitations governing
malignant asbestos-related conditions begins "when a plaintiff's symp-
toms manifest themselves to a degree or for a duration that would put a
reasonable person on notice that he or she suffers from some injury and
he or she knows, or with reasonable diligence should know, that the ma-
lignant asbestos-related condition is likely work-related. '259
Finally, in State and County Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Miller,260 the
supreme court held that a declaratory judgment action filed by a rein-
surer against both the primary insurer (State and County) and the insured
(Miller) did not preclude Miller from asserting certain extra-contractual
claims against State and County in a subsequent action.261 The court first
held that, because Miller and State and County were co-defendants in the
first suit, and neither had filed a cross-action against the other, the doc-
trine of res judicata was no bar to Miller's claims.262 The court further
held that certain of Miller's extra-contractual claims were not barred by
collateral estoppel, since those claims did not directly involve the issue of
liability under the policy decided in the first action.263
253. Id.
254. 35 S.W.3d 643 (Tex. 2000).
255. Id. at 652.
256. 761 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1985).
257. 776 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1985).
258. 765 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1985). The court also disapproved of the Beaumont appel-
late court's holding in Pecorino v. Raymark Indus. Inc., 763 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. App.-Beau-
mont 1989, writ denied). Pustejovsky, 35 S.W.3d at 653.
259. Id.
260. 52 S.W.3d 693 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam).
261. Id. at 694.
262. Id. at 696.
263. Id. at 697-98. The court also clarified that the applicable doctrine in concluding
that Miller's contractual claims were barred was not "law of the case," as the court of
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XIII. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
The Texas Supreme Court in John v. Marshall Health Services, Inc.,264
clarified the timing requirements for filing a motion for new trial under
Rule 329b(a) 265 in light of the language in Rule 306a(4), 266 when the mo-
vant lacks notice of the entry of a judgment when it was entered. Al-
though Rule 329b(a) 267 requires that motions for new trial be filed within
thirty days after the judgment is signed, Rule 306a(4) 268 provides that a
party adversely affected by a judgment may, if properly proven under
Rule 306a(5), 269 file a motion for new trial more than thirty days after the
judgment is signed, provided that the other requirements of Rule
306a(4) 270 are met (i.e., more than twenty days have passed after the
judgment is signed before the party affected receives notice thereof, but
less than ninety days have passed after the judgment has been signed). In
John, the trial court signed its judgment for the defendants on September
8th, which the clerk filed on September 13th. The plaintiff's counsel did
not learn of the judgment's signature and entry until September 30th,
during a telephone conversation with the clerk. The plaintiff then filed
his motion for new trial on October 13th, which was more than 30 days
after the judgment had been signed.
The supreme court, noting a split of authority on this issue among the
lower courts, reversed the decision of the appellate court and disap-
proved of those decisions that had held that a motion for new trial must
be filed within thirty days after the party receives actual notice of entry of
the judgment.271 Instead, the court held that Rule 306a(4)272 does not
require that such a motion be filed within any specified period, provided
the trial court retains its plenary power.273
appeals had stated, but collateral estoppel, since the matter arose in the context of a new
suit filed by Miller, not a "subsequent stage" of the original declaratory judgment action.
Id. at 698 (quoting Hudson v. Wakefield, 711 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex. 1986)).
264. 58 S.W.3d 738 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam).
265. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(a).
266. TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a(4).
267. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(a).
268. TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a(4).
269. TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a(5).
270. TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a(4).
271. John 58 S.W.3d at 741 n.12 (disapproving Thompson v. Harco Nat'l Ins. Co., 997
S.W.2d 607, 618 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1998, pet. denied); Gonzalez v. Sanchez, 927 S.W.2d
218, 221 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, no writ) (per curiam); Motalvo v. Rio Nat'l Bank, 885
S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ) (per curiam); and Womack-
Humphreys Architects, Inc. v. Barrasso, 886 S.W.2d 809, 816 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ
denied)).
272. TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a(4).
273. John, 58 S.W.3d at 741. The court also held that the plaintiff's "preliminary settle-
ment" with some of the defendants, which had not become final at the time of trial, did not
preclude the judgment entered by the trial court, which contained a "Mother Hubbard"
clause, from becoming final and appealable. Id. at 740. The court noted that since the
plaintiff had failed to either move for a separate trial with the settling defendants, get an
agreed judgment with them, dismiss his claims against them, or seek any relief from those
parties at trial, the judgment that was entered was properly considered final. Id.
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XIV. DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
The Texas Supreme Court addressed the timeliness of an objection to
an assigned judge in In re Canales.274 Overruling a court of appeals deci-
sion discussed in last year's Survey article,275 the court held that an objec-
tion to a visiting judge, under chapter 74 of the Texas Government Code,
must be made prior to the first hearing the judge presides over in the
case, rather than the first hearing he presides over pursuant to a particu-
lar assignment order.276 The court stated that the plain language of the
statute compelled its conclusion, and the underlying policy considerations
reinforced it.277 The court noted, however, that both assignment orders
in Canales were made pursuant to chapter 74 of the Government Code,
and it expressly did not consider "whether an objection to a second as-
signment would be timely if the first assignment were made under some
authority other than chapter 74."278
If a trial judge, presented with a timely recusal motion, declines to re-
cuse himself, the presiding judge of the administrative district must set a
hearing on the motion before himself or some other judge designated by
him.279 In In re Flores,280 the presiding judge decided to hear the recusal
motion himself and set the matter for hearing.2 81 The relator filed an
objection to the presiding judge under section 74.053(b),282 which was
denied.283 The court of appeals held that the objection was properly
overruled, since the presiding judge had not "assigned" the recusal mo-
tion to another judge pursuant to chapter 74, but instead heard the mo-
tion himself under the authority of Rule 18a.284
An unusual transfer between district court judges was at issue in In re
Cook Children's Medical Center.2 85 In this medical malpractice case,
which was pending before Judge Paul Enlow, the presiding judge assigned
another sitting district court judge, Bob McCoy, to hear a motion to dis-
miss for failure to file an expert report because Judge Enlow was in
trial.2 86 The assignment was for one day only, but was to continue there-
after as long as necessary for Judge McCoy to complete any trial that was
274. 52 S.W.3d 698 (Tex. 2001).
275. 2001 Annual Survey at 1671 (discussing In re Barrera, 9 S.W.3d 386 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 1999, orig. proceeding).
276. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 74.053(c) (Vernon 1998); see Canales, 52 S.W.3d at 700.
277. Id. at 702-03.
278. Id. at 704 (citation omitted).
279. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a(d).
280. 53 S.W.3d 428 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, orig. proceeding).
281. Id. at 429.
282. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 74.053(b) (Vernon 1998).
283. Flores, 53 S.W.3d at 430. The relator also filed a motion to recuse the presiding
judge, but the court found that it was untimely. Id. at 429-30.
284. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a; Flores, 53 S.W.3d at 431-32. The court brushed aside the
relator's reliance on the presiding judge's having signed an order of "assignment" to him-
self, stating that such an order was unnecessary under Rule 18a. Id. at 431-32 & n.1.
285. 33 S.W.3d 460 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, orig. proceeding).
286. Id. at 461-62.
1370 [Vol. 55
CIVIL PROCEDURE
begun or pass on any matters growing out of the motion to be heard.287
Judge McCoy granted the motion to dismiss and set a further hearing on
attorneys' fees.288 When the parties appeared for that hearing, however,
they were sent to Judge Enlow, who informed them that he was taking
the case back from Judge McCoy and who subsequently vacated the dis-
missal order.289 On mandamus, the court of appeals held that, because
Judge McCoy had not completed ruling on matters growing out of the
motion to dismiss, the assignment order had not expired, and Judge En-
low did not have the authority to unilaterally transfer the case back to his
court. 290 Although the appellate court recognized the broad discretion
given trial courts to transfer cases and exchange benches, it interpreted
the assignment order as giving Judge McCoy exclusive jurisdiction until
the order terminated by its terms.291
XV. DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNSEL
Standing to move to disqualify an attorney was at issue in In re Cap
Rock Electric Cooperative, Inc.292 The surviving entity in a merger of
electric cooperatives sought to disqualify the attorney who had previously
represented its merger partner in certain litigation.2 93 The court held
that, because of the merger, the former client had ceased to exist and
there was "no continuing attorney-client relationship deserving of protec-
tion" and disqualification was not warranted.2 94
XVI. MISCELLANEOUS
Section 65.011(1) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code au-
thorizes the issuance of an injunction if "the applicant is entitled to the
relief demanded and all or part of the relief requires the restraint of some
act prejudicial to the applicant. '2 95 Although the statute makes no men-
tion of an irreparable harm requirement, the supreme court held in Town
of Palm Valley v. Johnson2 96 that this requirement of equity continues
under the statute as well.2 97 The court explained that a contrary conclu-
sion would mean that the statutory remedy would have wholly replaced
the equitable one, which requires the additional showing of irreparable
287. Id. at 462.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Cook Children's Med. Ctr., 33 S.W.3d at 463.
291. Id.; see also Mendoza v. Fleming, 41 S.W.3d 781 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001,
no pet.) (judge assigned to preside over case in one judicial district in a county was author-
ized to continue to preside even after he transferred the case to another district court in the
same county and consolidated it with an earlier-filed case in that court).
292. 35 S.W.3d 222 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, orig. proceeding).
293. Id. at 224-25.
294. Id. at 228-29. The court also concluded that there was not a substantial relation-
ship between the former representation and the case in which the motion to disqualify was
brought. Id. at 231.
295. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 65.011(1) (Vernon 1997).





The enforcement of arbitration agreements continued to be a subject of
dispute during the Survey period. In In re American Homestar of Lancas-
ter, Inc.,299 the supreme court held that the federal Magnuson-Moss War-
ranty Act 300 does not prohibit the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate
warranty disputes. 301 The court found no congressional intent to pre-
clude enforcement of such agreements in Magnuson-Moss and no inher-
ent conflict between that statute and the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA"). 302 Significantly, in reaching this decision, the court considered,
but refused to defer to, the Federal Trade Commission's position regard-
ing the proper interpretation of Magnuson-Moss. 30 3
Efforts to avoid arbitration agreements were also unsuccessful in In re
FirstMerit Bank, N.A. 30 4 and In re David's Supermarkets, Inc. 30 5 In the
former case, the supreme court rejected the plaintiff's arguments that an
arbitration addendum to a consumer financing agreement was uncon-
scionable or resulted from fraud or duress. 306 In the latter, the court held
that the public policy concerns of Texas, as expressed in the workers'
compensation statutes, could not override the FAA's mandate favoring
the enforcement of arbitration agreements. 307
While favoring arbitration generally, however, the Texas courts con-
tinue to protect the rights of parties who have not validly agreed to arbi-
trate. For example, in Davidson v. Webster,308 the court held that an
alternative dispute resolution policy signed by an employee was not bind-
ing on the employer and, therefore, the employee was not required to
arbitrate his claims.30 9 Additionally, the court in Texas Enterprises, Inc.
v. Arnold Oil Co.310 refused to compel a non-signatory to an arbitration
agreement to submit to arbitration under a theory of equitable estoppel
where the movant had unduly delayed its request for arbitration. 31' Fi-
nally, in Glazer's Wholesale Distributors, Inc. v. Heineken USA, Inc.,312
the court held that a statute requiring arbitration, as applied to a party
that had not contractually agreed to arbitrate, was an improper delega-
tion of judicial authority in violation of the Texas Constitution.313
298. Id. at *1.
299. 50 S.W.3d 480 (Tex. 2001).
300. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12, et seq. (West 1998).
301. Am. Homestar, 50 S.W.3d at 482.
302. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (West 1999); Am. Homestar, 50 S.W.3d at 490.
303. Id. at 490-92 (citing 16 C.F.R. § 703.50) (2002)).
304. 52 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. 2001).
305. 43 S.W.3d 94 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, orig. proceeding).
306. FirstMerit Bank, 52 S.W.3d at 756-58.
307. David's Supermarkets, 43 S.W.3d at 99-100.
308. 49 S.W.3d 507 (Tex. App.- Corpus Christi 2001, pet. filed).
309. Id. at 514.
310. 59 S.W.3d 244 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet. h.).
311. Id. at 249-50.
312. No. 05-99-01685-CV, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 4401 (Tex. App.-Dallas June 29,
2001, no pet. h.).
313. Id. at *41-46; see TEX. CONST. art. V, § 1.
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Severe sanctions in a non-discovery context were not well-received by
the appellate courts during the Survey period. In In re Bledsoe,314 the
trial court struck the relator's pretrial pleadings for failure to timely com-
ply with a docket control order.315 The court of appeals held that such a
death penalty sanction could not be justified in light of the lack of
prejudice to the opposing party and the trial court's failure to first impose
any lesser sanction.316 Similarly, the court in Prevost v. Insurance Advi-
sors of Texas, Inc.,317 reversed an order sanctioning an attorney, and dis-
missing his client's case, that was based on the trial court's finding that an
oral settlement had been reached and that the attorney had perpetrated a
fraud on the court by denying the case had settled. 31 8 As there was no
signed settlement agreement between the parties in accordance with Rule
11,319 the court of appeals held that the attorney had not misrepresented
anything, and the case could not be dismissed.320
314. 41 S.W.3d 807 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, orig. proceeding).
315. Id. at 810-11.
316. Id. at 813-14. Accord In re Patton, 47 S.W.3d 825 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001,
orig. proceeding).
317. 46 S.W.3d 289 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied).
318. Id. at 291.
319. TEX. R. Civ. P. 11.
320. Prevost, 46 S.W.3d at 292-93.
2002] 1373
1374 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55
